Trang chủDomestic FootballVietnamese Football and the 'Money-Generating' Question Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026–2030
Domestic Football

Vietnamese Football and the 'Money-Generating' Question Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026–2030

**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: Bóng đá Việt Nam thiếu tiền dài, không chỉ thiếu tiền. Phát biểu của Bầu Đức trước Đại hội VFF nhiệm kỳ 2026–2030 đặt vấn đề thương mại hóa và đa dạng hóa nguồn lực, thay vì phụ thuộc một vài học viện và một vài ông bầu. **Dữ kiện chính**: - Ông Đoàn Nguyên Đức (Bầu Đức) là Chủ tịch HAGL, từng giữ ghế Phó Chủ tịch VFF phụ trách tài chính. - Học viện HAGL Arsenal JMG mở năm 2007, đào tạo Công Phượng, Xuân Trường, Tuấn Anh, Văn Toàn, Văn Thanh, Hồng Duy. - Ông chủ trương huy động doanh nghiệp đầu tư vào đào tạo trẻ, cơ sở vật chất, dinh dưỡng và chuyên môn. - Ông đề nghị bóng đá Việt Nam có đại diện trong các ban của FIFA, AFC và AFF để bảo vệ quyền lợi. - Phát biểu được đưa ra trước Đại hội VFF nhiệm kỳ 2026–2030, không kèm số liệu tài chính cụ thể. **Nguồn**: Phát biểu của Chủ tịch HAGL Đoàn Nguyên Đức trước Đại hội VFF nhiệm kỳ 2026–2030; ngày công bố không được nêu trong tài liệu gốc. | Đối chiếu: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: - Hỏi: Bầu Đức từng giữ chức vụ nào ở VFF? Đáp: Ông từng là Phó Chủ tịch VFF phụ trách tài chính trước khi trở lại vai trò Chủ tịch HAGL. - Hỏi: Vì sao việc đưa doanh nhân vào VFF không tự động tạo dòng tiền? Đáp: VFF là tổ chức xã hội – nghề nghiệp, nên muốn vận hành theo mô hình doanh nghiệp phải sửa cơ chế tài chính và cơ chế chịu trách nhiệm. - Hỏi: Học viện HAGL đào tạo nên những cầu thủ nào? Đáp: Công Phượng, Xuân Trường, Tuấn Anh, Văn Toàn, Văn Thanh, Hồng Duy — nhóm từng chiếm tỷ trọng lớn trong Chỉ số Chiều sâu Đội hình của VangBong.vn giai đoạn 2015–2022.

It was a Saturday night in Valencia, rain drumming on the tin roof of a small bar deep in the Ruzafa district. The television hung badly off-centre, replaying an old match nobody bothered to look up at. A young Vietnamese man who cooks at a nearby restaurant wiped both hands on his apron, sat down beside me, ordered a beer and asked: "Uncle, Bầu Đức says Vietnamese football has to learn how to generate money. But Spanish football is full of money, so why do clubs here still go bankrupt?" I did not answer straight away. Droplets clinging to the glass ran down in streaks, reached the bottom and stopped. A bar four kilometres from Mestalla, twelve thousand kilometres from Pleiku. He was asking me about money in Vietnamese football from a place where football has lived on broadcasting rights for three decades and is still in debt. I write one heartbeat slower so I never miss the moment a boot touches grass — even when that moment is half a world away, inside a blurry clip a friend sends me on Telegram at two in the morning. What Bầu Đức, the HAGL chairman, said was not an offhand remark. It landed before the VFF Congress for the 2026–2030 term, at the precise moment every Vietnamese football term gets dissected again: where the money is, who holds it, what it is spent on. Đoàn Nguyên Đức once held the VFF vice-chairmanship responsible for finance, so he knows what is inside which drawer. He said the VFF is a social-professional organisation; professionalising and commercialising it demands very large resources, businessmen who know how to create cash flow and how to manage, and above all who dare to spend. He added a heavier line: without money, do not talk about reaching higher. And he put himself in an awkward spot: Vietnamese football today cannot rely only on a few academies or a few patrons. The man who said that last sentence is himself one of those patrons. The HAGL Arsenal JMG academy opened in 2026, teaching football alongside schooling and foreign languages, and produced Công Phượng, Xuân Trường, Tuấn Anh, Văn Toàn, Văn Thanh and Hồng Duy. After more than twenty-five years in the game, he admits he had to pay the price for his own investment decisions. That is the heaviest fact in the story, and the least quoted. Vietnamese football carries an obvious paradox for anyone watching from outside: results are climbing, foundations are standing still. The national teams have collected titles from under-23 level up to the senior side, but the list of people who produced those titles is short. A few academies. A few names. A few backs carrying a generation. The resources of this game pool into two places: capital and people. Both depend on a handful of individuals. On capital, it is the patron model — one person puts up the money, makes the call, carries the risk. On people, it is the single-academy model. Put the two concentrations together and you get a single point of failure: one person stops, one production line halts. To be fair, the patron model has done what the system could not. Without people spending their own money over the past two decades, Vietnamese football would struggle to have a decent academy or a generation capable of touching continental competition. But a patron's balance sheet is tied to one person's fate, and nobody can sign a long-term contract with fate. "Generating money" sounds crude, yet it describes a precise economic task: turning the crowd's emotion into repeatable revenue. Football has four doors to money — matchday, broadcasting, sponsorship and player trading. For Vietnam the second is narrowing, the fourth opens very slowly because the transfer value of domestic players remains low. Most of the headroom sits behind the third and first doors: corporate sponsorship and gate money, money around the stadium. Both require something Vietnamese football does not yet have — confidence that money put in will not vanish within one term. The problem is that football cannot spend short money. A sponsor signs for one year to get a logo on a shirt; an academy needs ten years for its first finished product. Take the 2026 intake as a ruler: a boy born in 2026 entered at twelve, needed seven or eight years to play in the V.League, then a few more to become a name on the national bench. No sponsor signs a fifteen-year deal for a twelve-year-old. Long money is what Vietnamese football needs, and the Vietnamese market mostly manufactures short money. I still remember afternoons standing at the edge of a training pitch, about a metre and a half from the touchline, hearing studs bite into grass and a coach shouting in two languages. A metre and a half from the pitch, yet enough to feel the breath of the session. At that distance you do not see money. You only see time. Based on my experience watching matches — from V.League stands in the 1990s to La Liga grounds today — a club rarely collapses for lack of money. It collapses because it does not know how much it has, how much it owes, and how long it can survive. Spain has already walked the road Vietnam is standing in front of. In 2026, Spanish sports law forced most professional clubs to convert into public limited sports companies, with only four exempted: Real Madrid, Barcelona, Athletic Club and Osasuna. The purpose then sounded much like what Bầu Đức is saying now: bring business in, separate football from a private wallet, make the books transparent. Twenty years later the picture was not rosy. Between 2026 and 2026 a wave of La Liga clubs became insolvent, owing taxes and player wages, pleading for protection. Changing the ownership model saved a few balance sheets but did not save the spending habits. That is a lesson any league debating commercialisation should hear before signing anything. Spain's second turning point came later: Royal Decree-Law 5/2026 forced clubs to sell broadcasting rights collectively, applying from the 2026–2026 season. Before that, Real Madrid and Barcelona negotiated separately and took the bulk of the pot, with the rest distributed among the remaining clubs. When the money was shared out again, the gap between the top and the middle narrowed but did not disappear. It is worth remembering that this very broadcasting stream is under strain. Pay-television platforms buy rights with borrowed money and are repeating the mistake of the previous pay-TV generation: paying too much for an asset whose true value depends on whether viewers will pay more. If anyone in Vietnam is counting on rights money to generate cash, they are betting on a bubble that may already have peaked. Back to the young man's question in the bar. What does Vietnamese football lack most? What it lacks most is a spreadsheet. I could not find public figures for the VFF's annual revenue, the aggregate budgets of V.League clubs, or the league's wage bill. In any meeting about money, three questions must be answerable: how much do we have, how much do we spend, and how long until it runs out. Without a spreadsheet, every appeal is emotionally correct and operationally empty. In Spain, public limited sports companies must publish financial statements and file them with the league. That transparency did not make Spanish football honest, but it gave people a starting point for argument. Vietnamese football is arguing without any starting point at all. There is another constraint rarely mentioned: the VFF is a social-professional organisation, not a company. Putting businessmen on the board does not automatically create cash flow if the financial mechanism, the decision-making mechanism and the accountability mechanism do not change with it. Bầu Đức is talking about money, but what he is proposing is governance reform. One detail matters more than anything most quoted. Explaining why businessmen are needed, he said businessmen spend their own money and therefore have the motivation to find a suitable management model. That is the skin-in-the-game argument: whoever carries the risk earns the right to question how the money is spent. In Vietnamese football, the people who carried the most risk over twenty years have been the patrons, while those at the decision table change with each term. Seen from a distance, a blind spot is easy to spot: most of the debate is about money, very little about coach education. Money buys players. Money does not buy a playing philosophy, nor a generation of coaches able to teach that philosophy onward. That is the investment with the longest payback horizon, and the one least named on any panel. There is something else no spreadsheet measures. HAGL's golden generation did not succeed merely because its technique was better. They grew up together, slept in the same corridor of rooms, ate from the same tray, insulted each other in the same slang from the age of twelve. Ten years living side by side is an asset no transfer-data model can price. Data models routinely inflate a young player's potential and discount dressing-room chemistry — for Vietnamese football, that discount may be the most expensive mistake of all. What Bầu Đức warns about is not new: you cannot live forever on a few academies and a few patrons. What is new is that the speaker is one of those patrons, and admits he paid the price for his own investment decisions. When a man leaves the banquet table and comes back to say the table will not last, his words carry different weight. Outside, the popular reading is that he is asking for money or speaking for owners' interests. I do not take sides; I only record how the beer fell and how a generation swore. That reading is cheap and easy, but it skips the hardest part: more money flowing in could make Vietnamese football more short-term, not more long-term. If a few large corporations pour money into the V.League in the next two years, the first thing bought will be immediate results: better foreign players, shorter contracts, season targets instead of decade targets. Lose in a quarter and decisions get made in that quarter. A game that needs ten years to raise a generation will be run to the rhythm of a financial report every three months. That is the paradox few say out loud: more businessmen does not automatically mean more patience. So the right question is not how to generate money, but who is patient enough to hold it long enough. Vietnamese football needs a middle layer — people willing to put money into something that pays off in ten years, and willing to accept that their return comes as image, as standing, as a generation of players rather than a quarterly profit-and-loss sheet. Another direction is worth noting: Bầu Đức proposed that Vietnamese football place people inside FIFA, AFC and AFF committees to protect its interests and catch up with trends. In Asian federations, a committee seat can translate into advantages in scheduling, competition slot allocation and development funding packages. But such a seat runs on professional relationships accumulated over years, not on a single term. I do not need the dressing room door opened, as long as a fan opens up. The young man in Ruzafa opened up with a very honest question. And the answer, drawn from Spanish football's own history, is this: football does not die from a lack of money. It dies from spending money without knowing who it borrowed from. In the coming period I will follow the VFF Congress for the 2026–2030 term through a few signals, none of them the numbers shouted in headlines. I will watch whether the platform contains a financial roadmap with timelines and a mechanism for publishing figures. I will watch whether one or two new academies beyond HAGL break ground with long-term commitments rather than a groundbreaking ceremony. And I will watch whether Vietnamese names enter the specialist committees of AFC, AFF or FIFA in the next few years. There are evenings I choose to stay at the ground instead of going home, and in return I get a story nobody has told. The story of Vietnamese football over the next decade will be written where nobody broadcasts: a meeting room in Hanoi, a training pitch at six in the morning in Pleiku, a bar in Valencia where a kitchen hand asks me about money. If that question is still intact ten years from now, then Vietnamese football has not yet generated money — it has only generated arguments.

Vietnamese Football and the 'Money-Generating' Question Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026–2030