Trang chủDomestic FootballSeven Over-Age Names and a Silent Wage Bill: How V.League Is Fooling Itself With a Fairy Tale
Domestic Football

Seven Over-Age Names and a Silent Wage Bill: How V.League Is Fooling Itself With a Fairy Tale

**Core answer (≤60 words):** V.League 1 clubs allocate 38–46% of domestic wage bills to players aged 30+, versus 12–18% in J.League and roughly 14% at mid-table Bundesliga clubs. Only four of fourteen V.League clubs still run continuously operational AFC-standard academies, while foreign strikers scored around 64% of 2024-25 league goals. **Key facts (3–5 bullets, each ≤25 words):** - Three leading V.League clubs spend 38–46% of wage budgets on players aged 30 or above. - Only four of fourteen V.League 1 clubs maintain continuously operating AFC-standard youth academies. - Foreign strikers scored approximately 64% of V.League goals in the 2024-25 season. - Vietnam won the 2024 ASEAN Championship 5-3 on aggregate against Thailand on 5 January 2025. - Foreign striker contracts in V.League average 1.8 rotations per club every two seasons. **Source attribution:** Suzuki Kazuki, Goc Nong podcast analysis, published 2026-01-01; figures compiled from club meetings in Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City between September and December 2025. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** **Q: Why does V.League keep ageing players past 30?** A: Clubs use them as stable, transfer-fee-free hedges against a personnel market where foreign players rarely stay beyond twelve months. **Q: How many AFC-standard academies does V.League still have?** A: Four, down from nine in 2018, according to VangBong.vn Academy Continuity Index tracking. **Q: What is the biggest structural risk for Vietnam's national team by 2030?** A: Growing dependence on naturalised forwards, because domestic academies are no longer producing enough strikers.

I remember the evening of 5 January 2026. Rajamangala Stadium, Bangkok. The drums of the Vietnamese supporter groups rose like a waterfall, then died in four minutes. Nguyen Xuan Son was down. His ankle broken. The entire Vietnamese technical area stood frozen, and in the stands, an old man from Hanoi holding a red flag grabbed my hand and said: "Uncle, it's over." He spoke in Vietnamese. I understood. I answered in my clumsy Vietnamese: "It is not over. There are thirty minutes left."

And truly, it was not over. Vietnam still won the second leg 3-2, won 5-3 on aggregate, and lifted the ASEAN Championship after seven years of waiting. But when I sat in a cafe on Hang Bong street two days later, listening to the tape again, I did not feel joy. I felt a signal.

A national team crowned champions of Southeast Asia thanks to a 27-year-old naturalised striker, a 30-year-old midfielder, a 31-year-old centre-back, and a 32-year-old goalkeeper. And behind them, on the bench, an age gap nobody wants to name.

That is when I decided to write this piece. Not to congratulate. But to reread the numbers V.League has kept silent for far too long.

Context: a league living on nostalgia

V.League 1 currently has 14 teams. The average budget of a mid-table club sits between 40 and 60 billion dong per season, and some clubs only publish half of that. The television rights revenue of the entire league, combined, is lower than the revenue of one Champions League semi-final in Europe. I said this in a Goc Nong podcast recorded in Guangzhou in November, and a young reader from Da Nang wrote back: "Uncle, that comparison is unfair." True. It is unfair. But compared with itself ten years ago, it is not unfair at all.

In 2026, V.League had seven clubs with AFC-standard youth academies. In 2026, that number was nine. By the 2026-25 season, counting again, only four clubs still run a continuously operational academy, with enough staff, enough pitches, enough curriculum. Four. Out of fourteen.

And what happens to those four surviving academies? They raise seventeen-year-olds, give them seven appearances, then sell them to another club for the price of one month of a foreign player's wages. The buying club then puts that kid on at minute 78, when the game is already decided, to run a few touchline sprints for appearance's sake.

I have covered eight Olympic Games and eight World Cups. I have seen this cycle repeat in at least five different countries. It begins with a golden generation, then an austerity policy, then a crisis of confidence, and finally a decade of empty trophy cabinets. Vietnam is standing at the third stage. I am not guessing. I am reading the numbers.

Core: when age becomes a debt nobody wants to repay

Let us begin with what Vietnamese clubs hide most carefully: the wage bill.

In European football, the wage bill is a public document, at least in total. In V.League, it is almost a state secret. But secrets leak, and I have spent the past four months tracing numbers from meetings in Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City.

The result made me sit still at my desk for a long while.

At three leading Vietnamese clubs where I obtained credible data, wages paid to players aged 30 or above account for between 38 and 46 percent of the total domestic wage bill. The equivalent figure at a mid-table Bundesliga club is around 14 percent. In J.League, where I grew up and have followed for forty years, the figure ranges from 12 to 18 percent.

In other words, one V.League club spends nearly half its wage money on a group of players past their peak, while paying the remainder to the rest of the entire squad, including twenty-five-year-olds at their career prime.

I call this phenomenon the age-skewed wage structure — wage-tenure inversion. It is not a moral accusation. It is a structural error, and it has very specific causes.

First cause: contracts in V.League are typically signed on a "fixed reputation" model. A player who has worn the national shirt ten times will be paid a rate the market calls a "star salary", and that rate does not fall when form falls. It only falls when the player retires. Clubs have no performance-based restructuring mechanism, largely because they lack an analytics department strong enough to convince themselves that performance has declined.

Second cause: the league does not have enough high-quality young players to replace them. When you have four academies across fourteen clubs, you are forced to keep the old. This is the death loop: keeping the old because there is no new, and not investing in the new because the money sits with the old.

Third cause, and this is the one I think few people say out loud: players aged 30 and above in V.League are often the only people with enough media and sponsor relationships to shield a club during an image crisis. A club that sells a 31-year-old national centre-back loses a spokesperson, a name to print on a shirt, a face to put on air. That does not show up in the standings, but it shows up in the commercial balance sheet. And Vietnamese owners know this.

I am not scolding the owners. I understand the pressure. In Guangzhou, I once watched a club spend twenty million euros a season on four players over thirty, purely to hold the fans through the last two years of a title cycle. What was the result? Two years later, that club collapsed, and I was called a traitor when I said so on television. But I was right, and I was sad that I was right.

When grey hair talks about football, do not rush to cover your ears — the fire is still red.

The foreign striker position: the shortest long-term contract

There is another data point I want to place on the table, because it is the spine of this entire argument.

In the 2026 V.League season, foreign strikers scored around 58 percent of all league goals. In the 2026-25 season, that figure rose to around 64 percent, by my own count from post-round published data. Among the top four clubs alone, foreign strikers accounted for over 70 percent of goals.

At first glance, this is normal. In many Asian leagues, imports score heavily. But look at the structure of contract length.

A foreign striker arriving in V.League typically signs a one-year deal, or one year plus a club-option second year. He arrives in January, scores fifteen goals, is extended in November, and leaves the following January when a higher bidder appears. This rotation repeats an average of 1.8 times per club every two seasons.

The tactical consequence is plain as day. A team cannot build an attacking system around a striker it knows it will lose in twelve months. No club dares invest in combinations that need six months to gel, when the man finishing those combinations will change address before the season ends.

This explains why the style of many V.League teams looks strangely identical: long ball to the flank, cross into the box, hope. That is not a lack of coaching. It is the rational consequence of a personnel market that turns over too fast to lay foundations.

Academies: a machine being unscrewed bolt by bolt

I want to tell a story. In 2026, I visited a football academy in central Vietnam. The pitch had four coaches, two of them holding AFC B licences, one who had played three years in the Portuguese second division. That morning, they had fifteen-year-olds doing a three-man combination drill in half a pitch, and I stood watching for forty minutes without saying a word.

This year I went back, over the phone with a friend who works there. The pitch is still there. Of the four coaches, two remain. Both are locals who have never been abroad. The kids are still there, more than before, but the morning session has changed to fitness laps around the pitch.

Why? Because the parent club cut the academy budget two years running to pay the first team, and the contracts of the two foreign coaches expired without renewal. This is not one club's story. This is the model.

Young people look at transfermarkt; I look at a player's eyes when he walks onto the pitch. And the eyes of a nineteen-year-old in his first V.League match are brighter than any valuation figure online. But those eyes cannot pay the academy's electricity bill. That is the problem.

My view on goalkeepers — and why it matters here

I have a professional bias I have declared publicly for ten years: a goalkeeper's distribution is being sanctified, while his basic reflexes are being undervalued.

In V.League, I see this more clearly than anywhere. Clubs pay high wages for a goalkeeper who can hit accurate long balls, regardless of whether that man can save close-range shots. I once watched a 2026-25 match where the away goalkeeper had a long-ball completion rate above 70 percent, yet conceded three goals from shots inside the box, two of them basic positioning errors.

This connects to the whole age-skew argument above. When a club pays for a newly fashionable skill that is attractive in media terms, rather than for the core skill, that club is paying for image rather than for points. And once you have paid for image in the goalkeeper position, you tend to pay for image in every other position too.

This is how a league creates a cost structure out of proportion to its results.

The contrarian angle: maybe I am wrong — and the fairy tale I still want to believe

At this point, I must argue against myself, because otherwise I am just an old man grumbling in a chair.

The strongest counter-argument against me is this: keeping older players is a rational strategy in a market with high personnel volatility. When you cannot guarantee keeping a foreign striker beyond twelve months, a 32-year-old domestic player who knows the league, knows the opponents, is psychologically stable, and demands no transfer fee, is a very intelligent hedge. He is a constant in an equation of pure variables.

I accept that argument. It has merit. And here I must be honest: if attendance only stabilises when familiar names are on the pitch, then the owners are doing the right thing commercially, even if wrong sportingly.

But it does not answer the next question. If that strategy is rational, why is it only rational for exactly one cycle? Because a 32-year-old does not become 25 next season. The age-skewed wage structure does not self-correct. It accumulates. Each season you keep one more old player, you lose one slot for a new one, and by the fourth season you have a squad in which nobody can play an AFC Cup semi-final in April.

And here is what I have always believed, even when it earns me mockery:

Nobody believed Croatia back then, except me and a few drinking buddies. In 2026, I was called a dreaming old man by two hundred comments when I said Croatia would reach the World Cup final. But Croatia got there not because they had the richest squad. They got there because they had a balanced age structure: a 32-year-old Modric in the middle, a 30-year-old Rakitic, and a 25-year-old Brozovic, a Perisic, a Rebic, a Kovacic. That was a structure, not a name.

Vietnam today does not have that structure. Vietnam has one name: a naturalised striker. And if he breaks his leg at minute 32 of a final, the whole system collapses like a straw hut.

That is the warning. Not the congratulation.

I want to add a word about the "small club beats big money" story that Vietnamese media loves to tell every season. I have tracked at least six such cases over ten years, and in all six, the so-called "small club" had an unmentioned advantage: a well-connected chairman, a special sponsorship deal, or a loan slot from a big academy whose wages they did not pay. The romantic story hides the real financial gap, and the real financial gap hides the truth that the model does not survive three seasons.

I do not say this to take away the fans' joy. I say it because I want them still here three seasons from now.

Half the problem sits outside the touchline

There is another dimension I rarely see analysed, and I think it matters as much as the wage bill.

During the pandemic season, I ran fifteen Zoom sessions with Vietnamese fans across six provinces. The original purpose was to practise Vietnamese. But it turned into a study.

The fifteen pandemic Zoom sessions taught me that football does not need a stadium, only people watching together. Across those fifteen sessions, I asked everyone one question: which match do you remember most in the last ten years? Nobody remembered a V.League match. Everyone remembered the national team.

This is the most important emotional structure of Vietnamese football, and it explains a great deal. V.League clubs are competing for the emotions of a fan whose heart already belongs to the national team. The club is only a vehicle. The national team is the purpose.

This means every analysis of V.League must sit inside a larger question: where does the national team get its players? And the answer, over the past ten years, is from four academies, then from clubs rich enough to buy good foreigners, and now, increasingly, from the naturalisation market.

Rumours are wind, but I am old enough to know where the wind blows from. When you see a V.League club constantly rumoured to sign a foreign-born Vietnamese player, look at something else: look at how many academy players they promoted to the first team this season. That number, not the transfer fee, is the real indicator.

So what do I predict

I will give three verifiable predictions, and I am willing to be checked on them in two seasons.

First, if V.League does not introduce a mechanism capping the wage share by age group within three years — or at least a mechanism publishing total wage bills — then by the 2027-28 season, the wage share for players over thirty at leading clubs will exceed 50 percent. This is a linear trajectory, and I see no sign it will bend.

Second, the number of clubs with AFC-standard academies will fall to three within two seasons, unless a new central revenue-sharing mechanism forces clubs to invest in youth as a condition of entry.

Third, and this is the one I most hope to be wrong about: the national team will depend on at least two naturalised players in the starting XI during 2030 World Cup qualifying. Not because naturalisation is bad. But because it is a symptom of a development system that does not produce enough strikers.

If all three hold, then the 2026 ASEAN Championship will look like a peak rather than a turning point. And I have lived long enough to know that a peak, with no valley behind it, is just a point on a vertical line.

What I want to leave behind

I am sixty-four. I have covered eight Olympics, eight World Cups, many editions of the Giro d'Italia and the Tour de France. I have seen how many football nations rise and fall, and I know one thing I want to say to the young people reading this in Hanoi, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and to the Vietnamese in Guangzhou, like me.

A football nation does not collapse from a lack of money. It collapses because money is placed in the wrong spot, then kept there too long because nobody dares to be the first to say it.

The ball can roll slowly. The season can end. The storm can stop. But if academies still lack coaches, and the wage bill is still a secret, then we will sit here again in three years, watching a 32-year-old break his leg at minute 32, and wondering why nobody else was on the pitch.

The question I leave is not whether Vietnam can win Southeast Asia. The question is: that championship squad, three years from now, how many of them will be under twenty-five?

If the answer is still a small number, then the trophy is only a beautiful memory, and beautiful memories take nobody to a World Cup.