Trang chủInternational FootballCeferin Reverses Decision to Step Down: The Power Struggle Reshaping World Football
International Football

Ceferin Reverses Decision to Step Down: The Power Struggle Reshaping World Football

**Core answer:** On the same week of late 2025, UEFA President Aleksander Ceferin reversed his planned exit to seek a final term at the 22 April UEFA Congress in Astana, while 54 of UEFA's 55 member associations voted to declare lost confidence in FIFA's leadership under Gianni Infantino, and Ramon Vega became the first declared challenger for the March FIFA presidential election. **Key facts:** - Ceferin will seek re-election at the 51st UEFA Ordinary Congress on 22 April in Astana, Kazakhstan. - 54 of 55 UEFA associations backed reform proposals; Azerbaijan was the sole dissenting vote. - The FIFA presidential candidacy deadline is 18 November, with the election vote in March. - Ramon Vega declared his FIFA candidacy one day before Ceferin's reversal announcement. - Infantino's July plan to bring private investors into a FIFA commercial rights entity failed. **Source attribution:** Stage-2 Deep Professional Analysis of UEFA/FIFA governance reporting; publication date not specified in source. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** Q: Why did Aleksander Ceferin reverse his decision to step down? A: He cited "important work ahead" and a request from UEFA's national associations, recasting a personal reversal as a collective mandate ahead of the March FIFA election. Q: Why did UEFA's member associations lose confidence in FIFA's leadership? A: The declaration followed Infantino's failed July attempt to bring private investors into a new FIFA commercial entity holding World Cup-linked rights. Q: Who is challenging Gianni Infantino for the FIFA presidency? A: Ramon Vega, a former Swiss centre-back turned financier, became the first declared candidate before the 18 November deadline.

I remember that morning the way I remember a major transfer window. My phone buzzed at 6:12 a.m. Shanghai time, and a short line appeared from a familiar contact in Nyon: "He's changed his mind." Four words. No name, no title, no quote. In my trade, that kind of message is usually more trustworthy than a three-page press release, because it comes from a silence — from the place where someone hesitated a long time before typing it out. Aleksander Ceferin, president of the Union of European Football Associations, who only months earlier had announced he would step down, had reversed course. He would run for one more term, and he called it his "final term."

At the same time, in another time zone, a former Swiss centre-back named Ramon Vega had filed his candidacy for the FIFA presidency. And just one day later, 54 of UEFA's 55 member associations voted to pass a resolution expressing a loss of confidence in FIFA's current leadership under Gianni Infantino. One man changed his mind, one man issued a challenge, and one bloc withdrew its trust en masse. Three events, three days, and a power structure beginning to crack.

I never trust rumours; I trust the silences between phone calls. And that morning, the silence was long enough that I knew for certain: a new chapter in world football governance had just begun — not with a match, but with votes not yet cast.

Context: When votes matter more than the ball

To understand what is happening, we need to reconstruct a power map that very few Vietnamese fans pay attention to, yet which governs almost everything they watch on television every weekend. World football runs on a four-tier order. At the top sits FIFA — the global governing body, with 211 member associations, holding the power to decide the rules of the game, the global calendar and, most importantly, World Cup rights. Below FIFA are the continental confederations. UEFA leads them with 55 national associations, the wealthiest bloc, generating the most revenue, and carrying the heaviest voice in any vote. Then come the national associations, and finally the domestic league systems and clubs.

In that order, power does not flow in one direction. FIFA holds the votes of the whole world, but football's money sits in Europe. UEFA holds 55 votes, but those 55 votes are the votes of the countries that pay for nearly the entire commercial machine of this sport. The two need each other, and precisely because they need each other, they never stop fighting. That fight usually happens in silence, behind closed doors, in hotel corridors where people shake hands and then turn away. This time, it stepped into the light.

Gianni Infantino has held the FIFA presidency since 2026, after the corruption investigations that engulfed his predecessor Sepp Blatter. He arrived as a reformer, a man who wanted to expand the World Cup, bring football to new markets, and turn FIFA into a modern money-making machine. Aleksander Ceferin, a Slovenian lawyer, took over UEFA in 2026, the same year, and quickly became a counterbalancing voice. Those two men coexisted for nearly a decade, signing deals with each other, arguing with each other, and respecting each other to some degree. But everything came apart in July.

That was the month Infantino tried to bring private investors into a new FIFA commercial entity, a vehicle holding rights linked to competitions including the World Cup. This was the biggest, most ambitious and most controversial idea of his tenure. A vast financial vehicle, where private capital could flow into the most sacred forbidden zone of football. The plan failed. And that failure, in the way I read it from the silences that followed, became the drop that made the glass overflow.

A contract is never an ending; it is an open letter about the future. The July commercial plan was the same. It did not die when it was rejected; it left a crack. That crack spread through the whole system, and by autumn it had turned into open distrust.

Ceferin's reversal: A move calculated long in advance

When Ceferin announced his departure a few months ago, I did not fully believe it. In this trade, I have learned that a statement of departure is usually the beginning of a negotiation, not the end of a career. And so it proved. He returned, and the reason he gave was that there was "important work ahead," along with the fact that the national associations had asked him to continue.

Read that phrasing carefully. "Accepted their request." It is a political device polished down to the last letter. It turns a personal decision — one easily criticised as clinging to power, as ambition — into a collective mandate. If the associations asked, then his staying is no longer his business, but the business of an entire bloc. In governance, whoever controls how the story is told controls the story. Ceferin, with the instincts of a lawyer, understood that better than anyone.

But the story does not end there. What drew my attention more than anything was the timing. His reversal was announced in the same week as UEFA's reform vote, and just one day after Ramon Vega declared his FIFA candidacy. Those three events did not line up by chance. In organisational politics, coincidence is rarely coincidence. When several pieces fall at exactly the same moment, there is almost certainly a hand that placed them.

Ceferin Reverses Decision to Step Down: The Power Struggle Reshaping World Football

There is one thing I have observed over many years of watching governance meetings, from congresses to closed-door gatherings: the European bloc always acts most effectively when it has a figurehead. Ceferin is that figurehead. His choice to stay at UEFA rather than jump into the FIFA race has a very clear logic. If he ran for FIFA, he would confront Infantino head-on, turning the fight into a two-man duel with an unpredictable outcome and high risk. But if he stays at UEFA, he keeps his home base, keeps the 55-vote bloc, and lets someone else — such as Vega — carry the battle on the FIFA front. That is how a wise commander allocates forces.

A player who leaves always carries away half the story; the other half stays in the closed room. Ceferin left and then did not leave, and the half of the story held back is precisely the most interesting part. That is where the calculations about terms, about legacy, about the future of a 58-year-old man at the peak of power who does not want to let go too soon.

54 out of 55: What the number says about unity

In any vote, the ratio matters more than the absolute number. 54 out of 55 is 98.2%. For an organisation bringing together 55 countries with different interests, cultures, development levels and political relationships, achieving 98.2% consensus is a feat. It shows one thing: dissatisfaction with the current FIFA is no longer the scattered emotion of a few large federations; it has become a collective position, tightly organised.

But precisely because the ratio is so close to absolute, what I notice most is the single dissenting vote. Azerbaijan. One country, one federation, one ballot standing outside the common current. In sport, those who stand alone are often seen as out of place. But in governance, the person standing alone is often the one holding a relationship, a deal, or an interest that the majority does not have. Azerbaijan's vote does not prove anything certain, but it marks a point worth watching. When a bloc unites at 98.2%, the 1.8% dissenter becomes the most noteworthy variable in the equation.

I recall a principle I learned from years of transfer reporting: in any collective, perfect consensus is suspicious, while lone disagreement is worth studying. Consensus can be bought with pressure, with timing, with the silence of those who do not want to speak up. But a person who dares to say "no" amid a bloc saying "yes" usually has a reason of their own, and that private reason is information.

What also matters is the nature of the resolution. The associations did not merely disagree over a technical detail. They declared a "loss of confidence in FIFA's current leadership." That is an institutional-level censure, rarely stated so bluntly in the diplomatic environment of football, where people usually speak in circles to preserve each other's dignity. A public declaration of lost confidence is a sign that the closed channels of dialogue have dried up. When people still believe in dialogue, they do not issue resolutions. When they issue resolutions, dialogue has failed.

Ramon Vega: The challenger from off-stage

Ramon Vega is not a name many Vietnamese fans remember. He was a centre-back who wore the shirts of Tottenham and Celtic during his playing career, and after retiring he moved into finance and investment. A former player turned investor, then turned FIFA presidential candidate — that is a trajectory that follows no template. And precisely because it follows no template, he becomes noteworthy.

For decades, FIFA presidential elections followed a familiar script: the incumbent re-elected, sometimes unopposed, or with a token opponent. The emergence of a genuine candidate — with a background, a voice, and the courage to declare — changes the entire character of the race. It turns a coronation into an election. And in football, a genuine election is what governing leadership always wants to avoid.

I have witnessed something similar in the transfer market. When a club believes it is a player's only option, it negotiates from a position of strength. But the moment a second club enters, the whole balance shifts. The arrival of a rival does not necessarily reverse the outcome, but it forces the party holding the advantage to pay more, concede more, and worry about every detail. Ramon Vega, win or lose, has achieved one thing: he has put Infantino on the defensive.

The bigger question is whether Vega has enough votes to win. An off-stage candidate, not from the football bureaucracy, without a network of national associations built over decades, usually starts with a huge disadvantage. But in a year when the European bloc has publicly lost confidence in the incumbent leadership, that disadvantage could turn into an advantage. If UEFA decides to throw its votes behind one person, it has 55 votes in hand. And 55 votes, in an election with 211 associations, is a number that can make a big difference if it can assemble more allies from other continents.

The transfer market is like a chess game; the pandemic only exposed moves that had been hidden. The FIFA election is the same. It does not create new alliances; it only exposes alliances that have long existed in silence.

Two elections, one power structure

What makes the situation complex is that two elections are running in parallel. The first is at FIFA, with a candidacy deadline of 18 November and ballots cast in March. The second is at UEFA, with the 51st Ordinary Congress scheduled for 22 April in Astana, Kazakhstan, where Ceferin will stand for re-election.

Two elections, two countdown clocks, two battlegrounds. But they are not separate. They are two faces of the same power structure. The outcome of one election will directly affect the landscape of the other. If UEFA holds its unity under Ceferin, it will be a powerful negotiating bloc in the fight with FIFA. If FIFA changes leadership, the entire balance of power between continents will be redrawn.

In my trade, I always look at the schedule to understand motives. Timing is never random. Ceferin's announcement of his re-election bid for 22 April, just before the March FIFA election, is not an accidental arrangement. He needs to be sure of his home base before entering the peak phase of the FIFA fight. A commander never advances while the rear is still unsettled.

Conversely, UEFA's decision to vote on reforms and declare lost confidence in FIFA just days after Vega's declaration shows coordination. The European bloc wanted to send a clear message before the FIFA race officially began. That message was: we are not on the side of the status quo, and we have enough strength to create change.

The July commercial vehicle: Where everything began to break

To understand why dissatisfaction erupted at exactly this moment, we need to go back to July. That was the month Infantino pushed a plan to bring private investors into a new FIFA commercial entity holding rights linked to competitions including the World Cup.

Picture the scale of this idea. The World Cup is the single most valuable sports asset on the planet. Each World Cup generates billions of dollars in revenue from broadcasting rights, sponsorship, tickets and commerce. Placing part of that asset into a vehicle involving private capital is a move that changes how football is financed at a foundational level. Supporters say it brings new capital, new expertise and growth for the sport. Opponents say it places football's common asset in the hands of those interested only in profit.

The plan failed in July. And in the way I read it from the signs that followed, that failure itself sparked the wave of opposition to Infantino. When a bold plan is rejected, the leader who proposed it loses credibility. And in an organisation where power rests on trust, losing credibility is losing everything.

There is one thing that always surprises me when I observe football governance: how decisions at the highest financial level can produce such profound political consequences. A commercial plan is, by nature, a business document. But when it concerns control of a common asset, it becomes a matter of power. And power, in football, is always tied to honour, to identity, to the sovereignty of national associations.

I once told a colleague: to understand a football governance crisis, do not read the press release, read the balance sheet. Because money is where the truth cannot hide. The July plan, though presented as a development initiative, was in essence a negotiation over who would control the money flow of the World Cup for the next two decades. And when that negotiation failed, those who felt shut out turned to the ballot to reclaim their voice.

Reform as a shield

After being publicly distrusted by the European bloc, Infantino's response was to propose an independent review of FIFA's decision-making process, along with consultations with stakeholders.

This is a classic defensive move. When accused of losing control, propose a new control mechanism. When suspected of opacity, invite a third party to review. In doing so, the leader shifts from a passive to an active position, from the person being questioned to the person offering solutions.

But there is a truth those of us in the trade all know: an independent review is only valuable if it is genuinely independent. If the reviewer is chosen by the very person being reviewed, the result is predetermined. In the history of sports governance, there have been no shortage of reviews announced with solemn ceremony, only to end in a long, bland report that leads to no change. Infantino's difficulty lies here: to convince the European bloc, his review must be serious enough to produce real change. But if it produces real change, it could threaten his own position.

This is the paradox of every leader facing a crisis of trust. Too little reform does not soothe. Too much reform undermines yourself. One must walk a very thin wire, and any gust of wind can bring you down.

What is really being contested

Seen on the surface, this fight looks like a personal clash between Ceferin and Infantino. Two men, two egos, two ambitions. But seen more deeply, what is being contested is far bigger: the governance model of world football over the coming decade.

On one side is the centralised model Infantino represents. FIFA is the centre, holding decision-making power over the calendar, the competitions, the commerce. Continents and countries play an implementing role. In this model, FIFA can negotiate with private investors from a centralised position and can push through major changes such as expanding the World Cup to 48 teams.

On the other side is the balance-of-power model the European bloc is moving toward. Continents and countries have a genuine voice in important decisions. Commercial rights are not concentrated in a single vehicle controlled by a small group. And every major change must be agreed by consensus, not imposed from above.

The battle between these two models is not new. It has smouldered for years, across several terms. But the July commercial plan turned it into an open war, because it touched the most sensitive point: who controls football's most precious asset.

I have spent many years following transfer negotiations, and I have recognised a rule: when two parties fight over an asset, what they are really fighting over is not the asset, but the right to determine the future. A club buys a player not just to have him in the squad; it buys the right to control what he will become. The FIFA-UEFA fight is the same. What is being contested is not a presidency, but the right to shape football for the next twenty years.

Blind spots of the official story

In every governance crisis, there is an official story everyone tells, and a real story underneath. The official story here is simple: Ceferin reversed his decision because the associations asked him to continue, and UEFA lost confidence in FIFA over governance concerns. It sounds reasonable. But there are three blind spots the official story does not mention.

The first blind spot is the timing of the reversal. Ceferin announced his departure a few months ago. If the associations truly needed him so much, why did they not speak up the moment he announced he was leaving? Why did the change come in exactly the week the FIFA race heated up? The answer may lie here: what the associations need is not Ceferin in general, but Ceferin in a specific fight. When there was no fight, he was not necessary. When the fight arrived, he became irreplaceable.

The second blind spot is the nature of the 54-out-of-55 unity. Near-absolute consensus is often presented as a sign of collective strength. But it can also be a sign of pressure. In a bloc where everyone votes the same way, sometimes it is not because they share a view, but because they do not want to be the one standing outside. Azerbaijan's lone dissent may be the only voice daring to say what others think but dare not say.

The third blind spot is the true meaning of the phrase "final term." In governance language, this phrase is used to reassure those worried about clinging to power. But it is also a commitment open to interpretation. Whose "final term," under which statutes, and is it legally binding? If UEFA's statutes allow flexible interpretation, this phrase could simply be a nice way of saying a longer term still. And football's history is full of leaders who promised not to stay, only to stay.

In football, nothing is permanent — not even promises made before the cameras. The phrase "final term" is such a promise. It can be kept, and it can also be reinterpreted when circumstances change. Fans have a right to be sceptical, because they have heard similar promises many times before.

A lesson from an outsider

There is one figure in this story I want to spend time on: Azerbaijan, the only association to vote against. No one knows for sure why. Perhaps because of a special relationship with FIFA's current leadership. Perhaps because of a strategic calculation of its own. Perhaps for a reason we will never know.

But I recall what I learned from following small transfers. In every big transfer window, there are always small deals the media ignores. Yet those small deals often reveal the most about the true motives of the parties. A club selling an unknown young player may be doing something much bigger than it appears: building a relationship, repaying a debt, or placing a piece for the future.

Azerbaijan's vote is the same. It is small, but it is a signal. It reminds us that behind perfect blocs of unity, there are always individuals with calculations of their own. And in a power struggle, those individuals can become the decisive card at the last minute.

I have always believed that to understand a vote, you must understand those who do not vote with the majority. They are the ones holding information the majority does not have. They are the ones who know something others do not. In this case, Azerbaijan's lone vote is an unanswered question, and that question is worth watching.

When governance becomes theatre

One interesting thing about this crisis is how it is presented in the media. Headlines focus on confrontation, on ego, on strong statements. "Ceferin tells Infantino to go," "UEFA loses confidence in FIFA." These headlines sell papers, but they conceal the true nature of the problem.

I have told many young colleagues: never read the headline of a governance story, read the body. Because the headline is designed to shock, while the body holds dry but important truths. In this case, the body tells us specific numbers: 54 out of 55, 18 November, 22 April, March. Those numbers are the backbone of the story. The headline is only make-up.

2026 taught me that: the media does not report transfers, the media creates transfers. The same is true of governance. The media does not merely report governance crises; it helps create them, by amplifying tensions, by framing figures into roles, and by turning closed negotiations into open wars. When a crisis reaches the front page, it becomes harder to resolve, because the parties can no longer concede in silence without losing face.

This is a paradox I have witnessed many times. Public light can illuminate, but it can also freeze. When an issue is brought before the public, the parties involved become locked into their positions, because changing position in public is an admission of weakness. In this case, both Ceferin and Infantino have said things they can hardly retract. And precisely because they are hard to retract, the road to a compromise solution becomes longer.

What is happening behind closed doors

While the public follows public statements, the most important things are happening where no one can see. That is the nature of sports governance. Big decisions are not made on stage; they are made in closed meetings, in private dinners, in midnight phone calls.

I imagine what is happening behind the scenes in these weeks. There may be calls between Ceferin and national association presidents, to secure support for his re-election in Astana. There may be meetings between European associations and associations from other continents, to build a coalition for the FIFA election. There may be negotiations with Ramon Vega about whether he is a genuine candidate or merely a piece in a larger game.

There is one possibility I cannot ignore. In the analysis, I read a suggestion that the associations are looking for a figure who is "respected, capable of unifying, and deeply rooted in football." That profile does not quite match Ramon Vega. It matches more an elder statesman, a respected former official, someone who could assemble broad consensus without generating too much controversy. If so, Vega's candidacy may be only the first step, a way to open a race in which the real candidates will appear later.

Of course, this is speculation. And I am always cautious with speculation. But in my trade, sometimes you must read what has not yet happened to understand what is happening. What matters is not predicting the future precisely, but understanding the possibilities opening up.

Asian football and what lies ahead

There is one aspect of this story I, as someone living and working in Asia, care about especially. That is the impact of this governance crisis on Asian football in general and Southeast Asia in particular.

Asian football usually stands outside the big power struggles between UEFA and FIFA. But it is not immune. When the fight between continents erupts, smaller federations often have to choose sides, or are forced to choose sides. And in a FIFA election, every vote has value. Asian associations, with their large numbers, could become the decisive force in a close race.

This raises a question for Vietnamese and regional football. When the big blocs compete for influence, where should smaller federations stand? The answer is not simple. Standing on either side has its price. Standing with FIFA may bring concrete benefits, investments, development programmes. Standing with the reform bloc may bring a fairer governance model in the long term. But in the short term, both choices carry risk.

I have observed smaller federations in many elections, and I have recognised that the wisest ones usually do not choose sides early. They wait, observe, and make their decision at the most advantageous moment. In sports politics, timing is everything. The one who goes first sometimes wins, but the one who goes at the right time usually wins more.

What happens next

As I look ahead, I see a sequence of events already scheduled. 18 November, the deadline for filing FIFA presidential candidacies. There may be more candidates. There may not. March, the ballots are cast. And 22 April, the UEFA Ordinary Congress in Astana, where Ceferin stands for re-election.

Each of these milestones is an opportunity for the story to change. A new candidate appearing could upend every calculation. A compromise reached could ease the tension. An unexpected decision could open an entirely new chapter.

But there is one thing I believe is certain. Whatever the outcome of these two elections, world football will not return to its state before July. The rejected commercial plan left a crack, and that crack will remain present for years. The battle over football's governance model has begun, and it will not end with a single ballot.

What I learned from this crisis

In more than twenty-five years of following this industry, I have witnessed many governance crises. But this one has something special: it comes at a time when football is recovering from hard years, when competitions have returned to audiences, when revenues are rising again, and when everyone is eager to look forward to the World Cups to come. A leadership crisis at the very moment everything is heading up is something no one wants.

But perhaps precisely because everything is heading up, the fight has become fierce. When the pie is bigger, the scramble for the pie becomes more intense. And football's pie has never been bigger.

We hunt news, but in truth we hunt people's dreams. I wrote that sentence years ago, when I was still following transfers. But it holds true for governance as well. The people sitting in the meeting rooms of Nyon and Zurich are not merely fighting over power. They are fighting over the right to shape the dreams of billions. The dream of a child in Vietnam who wants to one day see their national team play in a World Cup. The dream of a fan who wants the sport they love to be run fairly. The dream of a young player who wants to play on the biggest stage.

When leaders fight over control, those dreams become hostages. And that is what I always remind myself whenever I write about dry governance stories: behind every resolution, every ballot, every statement, are people with dreams.

Looking ahead

There is one thing I learned after many years in this trade: never judge a crisis only by what it breaks, but by what it might create. This governance crisis could lead to division, paralysis, and prolonged distrust. But it could also lead to a more transparent, more balanced, more sustainable governance model.

What I hope is that both sides understand they cannot win entirely. In an interdependent system, the absolute victory of one side means the weakening of the whole system. UEFA needs FIFA to have a global stage. FIFA needs UEFA for resources and credibility. Neither can exist without the other.

There are deals signed on paper, and there are deals signed in tears. This fight will be signed with compromises no one wants to admit. And perhaps that is the best that can happen. Because in football, as in life, the hard compromises are often the most durable ones.

As I closed my notes on this crisis, I asked myself what will remain after it all. Ballots will remain, terms will remain, titles will remain. But above all, one question will remain, one every generation of football leadership must answer: whose sport is this? Does it belong to those in the meeting room, or to those in the stands?

I have spent my career reporting on the people and decisions that shape football. And if there is one thing I have learned, it is this: football always finds a way to survive its own crises. Not because its leaders are great, but because those who love it are patient. They will keep going to the stadium, keep watching, keep dreaming. And as long as they do that, football will stand firm, whoever sits in the most powerful chair.

A contract is never an ending; it is an open letter about the future. And the letter world football is writing to itself in the coming months will be opened in March, and again on 22 April in Astana. What lies inside it, no one knows for certain. But I will be there, watching every silence, because the truth about football's future usually lies in the places where no one speaks.

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