Trang chủInternational FootballThe Four-Million-Dollar Book Cover and the Image-Rights Gap Football's Academies Still Don't Teach
International Football

The Four-Million-Dollar Book Cover and the Image-Rights Gap Football's Academies Still Don't Teach

**Câu trả lời cốt lõi:** Emma Coronel đệ trình vụ việc lên Viện Sở hữu Công nghiệp Mexico (IMPI) với Penguin Random House, cáo buộc nhà xuất bản dùng hình ảnh cô lấy từ Instagram trên bìa sách để khai thác thương mại. Vụ việc là tiền lệ đáng chú ý về quyền hình ảnh áp dụng cho bóng đá. **Dữ kiện chính:** - Emma Coronel, vợ Joaquín Guzmán, nộp đơn lên IMPI; luật sư Hugo Torres là phát ngôn viên duy nhất trên hồ sơ báo chí. - Khoảng 200.000 bản in được ghi nhận; giả định 20 USD/cuốn cho ra ước tính 4 triệu USD doanh thu gộp, không phải lợi nhuận ròng hay mức bồi thường. - Lập luận nguyên đơn: bìa sách đã biếm hoạ hoá hình ảnh, tức ch

Hamburg, February, three degrees. In the meeting room of a football academy, a fifteen-year-old sits beside his mother and signs eleven pages. Page seven is about image rights: worldwide, in perpetuity, covering every medium now known and every medium invented later. The boy asks nothing. His mother asks nothing. The academy officer turns to page eight, and the signing is over in forty minutes — exactly the length of one half of football.

Eleven time zones west, a photograph taken on a phone and posted to Instagram has become the centre of an administrative proceeding. The claimant is Emma Coronel. The respondent is Penguin Random House. The filing sits with Mexico's Institute of Industrial Property. The print figure mentioned is two hundred thousand copies. The assumed cover price is twenty dollars. The multiplication yields four million dollars.

The space behind that fifteen-year-old is exactly fourteen metres wide — but the real dead zone sits on page seven of a contract nobody in the room read aloud.

One filing in Mexico, one page in Hamburg

The story on the other side of the Atlantic can be told in a few lines. Emma Coronel, wife of Joaquín Guzmán, filed with Mexico's Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) over a major publisher's use of her image — taken from a social-media post — on a book cover. Her lawyer, Hugo Torres, is the only voice on the record. He explained that the claimant does not dispute the book's investigative content, only the commercial exploitation of her likeness. The publisher, as reported second-hand, invoked freedom of expression. The argument advanced by the claimant is that the cover altered the colours and transformed the photograph in a "caricaturised" direction to increase its marketability — a clearly commercial purpose rather than a purely informational one.

Two things need recording before the story gets carried away by the flashy numbers.

First, every contested fact in the reporting traces to a single source, and that source is an interested party. No court document, no publisher statement, no IMPI filing is quoted. That does not make the story false. It makes it unverified.

Second, the public-disclosure date is given as 16 October, while the rest of the timeline — a book published in 2026, a filing said to have been lodged "months earlier" — does not reconcile. That detail needs checking before anyone builds a trustworthy timeline on it.

As for the four million dollars: the article itself states plainly that this is a gross-revenue estimate, not net profit, and certainly not a likely award. A two-layer multiplication — a print figure supplied by one side, times a cover price assumed by a journalist. Two layers of uncertainty stacked on each other.

Why would someone who writes about football in Hamburg sit down with an industrial-property filing from Mexico?

Because the legal architecture in that filing is the same architecture governing the face of every footballer on the planet. A phone photo used on a book cover, a face used on a video-game cover, a name used in a simulation game, a body used in a betting advertisement — all of them pass through the same question: who owns the image, who may license it, and who sits at the table to set the price.

In nine years covering this industry I have read hundreds of academy contracts across Europe. Not once has a fifteen-year-old asked about the image-rights page. Not once has a coach asked on his behalf.

Two different rights, two different owners

Start here, because most arguments about "footballers' image rights" slip at this first step.

There are two entirely separate rights. One is the personality right to your own likeness — the right to decide who may use your face commercially. The other is copyright in a specific photograph — the right of the person who took it, or of whoever employed them. The person in the picture and the owner of the picture can be different parties, holding different rights, adjudicated in different forums.

In the Mexican filing, this distinction is central. A photo Coronel posted herself may still carry copyright belonging to her or to the platform, depending on the terms of service. But the image right — the personality right — remains hers, and that is what she is defending. Filing with IMPI rather than a copyright or civil personality-rights forum is a deliberate choice, and it suggests the case may be constructed around trademark or unfair-competition grounds rather than pure portrait rights. The public record does not clarify this. That is a genuine analytical gap, and it deserves stating rather than papering over with a tidy conclusion.

In football, this split produces a consequence few notice: a player almost never owns the best photograph of himself. The picture of him scoring in the ninetieth minute belongs to the agency photographer, or the club, or the league. He owns the face in the picture, not the picture. And commercially, the party holding the copyright usually decides where the picture appears before the party holding the face gets a word in.

The architecture of selling a face

A professional footballer in Europe typically signs three layers of image licensing, and most cannot tell them apart.

The first is the employment contract with the club. It contains a clause permitting the club to use the player's image for club purposes — match promotion, shirt sales, digital content, commercial partners. The split at this layer varies widely. Some major clubs operate a model that divides image value roughly in half with the player; others leave the player most of it and take only a narrow category. There is no common European standard, and that absence of standard is where disputes originate.

The second is the individual deal between player and sponsor — boot brands, watch brands, banks, airlines. This is where stars actually earn, and the layer most players in mid-tier leagues never reach.

The third is collective licensing. FIFPro, the international players' union, signs agreements with video-game publishers covering the likenesses of tens of thousands of players in a single package. This is the least discussed layer and the one that determines most of the money actually reaching players from the digital market.

These three layers can conflict. A player signs an individual deal with a drinks brand while his club holds an exclusive deal with a rival drinks brand — a situation far more common than the public imagines. A player is licensed collectively to a game while his individual boot deal states that only that brand may use his image in interactive digital environments. None of this is resolved by a sports tribunal. It is resolved by contract lawyers, usually after the damage is done.

A player's image value does not sit in his face. It sits in the clause defining who may say no on his behalf.

November 2026: when two stars asked a simple question

There was a moment when this question left the meeting room and went onto social media.

In November 2026, Zlatan Ibrahimović posted a direct question: who gave permission to use his name and face in the world's most popular football video game? Gareth Bale publicly backed him. Their agent at the time, Mino Raiola, sided with them and raised the issue with the publisher.

The publisher's response, in substance, was that it held agreements with the players' union and with clubs, and that collective licensing was the lawful mechanism for using player likenesses in a game.

Both sides were right within their own frame. And because both were right, the episode is a far cleaner lesson than the way it was reported.

What Ibrahimović and Bale raised was not a question of law. It was a question of price. Collective licensing is lawful. But collective licensing means the price is set at the average level of tens of thousands of people, not at the level of one global star's individual value. For a player in the Norwegian second tier, the share from a collective package can be meaningful money. For a player with hundreds of millions of followers, that same share is an insult of proportion.

This is where the system exposes its structural weakness. Collective licensing solves access; it never solves valuation. It flattens a distribution that is extraordinarily skewed. In football, a very small number of players generate a very large share of commercial value, yet the collective mechanism pays nearly everyone at close to the same rate, because that is the only way a licensing package covering tens of thousands of people can be administered.

I have spent years reading the financial reporting of European players' unions. Every model hits the same paradox: to get money out of the video-game market, players must act collectively. But once they act collectively, the strongest individual loses the ability to price himself. No mechanism in the current system solves both problems at once.

Where the contract gets signed away: the academy

Back to the meeting room in Hamburg.

The academy is where image rights are transferred with the highest concentration and the lowest awareness. A fifteen-year-old has no official agent, or has one introduced by the academy itself. The boy wants to play. The family wants him to play. And the paper in front of him is presented as paperwork, not as a commercial agreement.

Academy-level image clauses tend to share four features.

They run for a very long time — usually in perpetuity, or tied to the entire playing career plus several years beyond it.

They are very broad, covering all media, all territories, and often adding a line about "media not known at the time of signing".

They contain no pricing provision. No revenue share, no floor, no review mechanism when the player's market value rises.

And they often contain no termination clause when the player leaves. The boy moves to another club, signs his first professional contract, and discovers that part of his image rights still sits with an entity he has no remaining connection to.

A forty-word clause can outlive the playing career of the person who signed it.

This is why I read the Mexican filing with an attention that initially surprised even me. The mechanism is identical. A private individual posts an image in one context; the image reappears in another context, generating value for a third party, with no agreement on price. The only difference between Coronel and the fifteen-year-old in Hamburg is that Coronel has a lawyer and a forum to file in. The boy has a February afternoon.

One further point rarely discussed: in many countries, contracts with minors are constrained by special protective rules. But those rules were usually written for employment contracts, not for perpetual personality-rights licences. A fifteen-year-old may be barred from signing a long-term employment contract and still be free to sign an unlimited-duration image licence. That gap exists across most European legal systems, and it exists because nobody has yet had enough money to litigate it.

The Sega case and the line between description and exploitation

There is a precedent worth setting beside the Mexican filing, and it comes from football itself.

Manchester United took Sega and Sports Interactive to the English High Court over the use of the club's name in Football Manager. Most of the club's arguments were not accepted. The court's view, in substance, was that naming a real club inside a football simulation is descriptive use of fact, not commercial exploitation of the club's reputation.

That line matters more than it appears.

If a product uses an image to describe reality, it stands on the safe side. If it uses an image to generate commercial appeal — to sell more, to look better, to evoke emotion — it stands on the risky side. In the Mexican filing, the claimant's argument is precisely an attempt to push the book cover from the first category into the second: the cover was recoloured, transformed, and therefore is no longer description but a commercial product designed to sell.

This is the cleverest argument in the file, and also the most dangerous — in both directions.

It is clever because it sidesteps the entire free-press debate. It does not say "don't write about me". It says "if you transform my image in order to sell books, you pay".

It is dangerous because if it succeeds, the principle established is very broad. Anyone who alters a person's image to make a product more appealing could be treated as commercially exploiting it. In football, that principle reaches almost everything: matchday magazine covers, broadcast graphics, club social content, in-game imagery, and even short videos in which a player's face is colour-graded.

And if it fails, the principle established is: using a person's public image on the cover of an editorial publication is protected. That creates a wide safe harbour for publishing and a wide risk zone for anyone seeking control of their own likeness.

Both outcomes carry consequences for football. Neither is neutral.

The four-million multiplication and the gross-revenue trap

In this trade I have learned one habit: whenever a number appears in a dispute story, the first task is to establish what it measures.

Two hundred thousand copies at twenty dollars is four million dollars. The arithmetic is correct. But that four million is gross retail revenue, and it differs from publisher net profit by at least four intermediate layers: wholesale and retail discounts, print and distribution costs, author advances, and author royalties — the trade-publishing norm sits around ten per cent of net receipts on print. After four layers, what a claimant could realistically target is far smaller than the headline figure.

And there is a more important detail: the two hundred thousand figure is described as "accredited", meaning compiled by the claimant's side. The full sales ledger sits with the publisher. In every dispute of this kind, the party holding the ledger is stronger than the party forced to estimate.

A number supplied by the weaker party, multiplied by a price assumed by a journalist, does not produce a valuation — it produces a hypothesis wearing the appearance of a valuation.

I have seen this exact pattern in football hundreds of times. A club announces a transfer fee. That fee includes performance add-ons, appearance add-ons, a sell-on share for the selling club, and sometimes payments deferred across four years. The press reports the first number. Fans argue about the first number. Nobody argues about the structure.

During the empty-stadium season I analysed eighty-seven matches in the German second tier. Home win rates fell from forty-three per cent to thirty-four per cent. Average goals fell from 2.6 to 2.1. I presented those figures to three people and all three asked the same question: what caused it? Nobody asked: how were those eighty-seven matches selected? What disqualified the other one hundred and twenty-seven matches of that season?

Numbers do not speak on their own. They speak only when you know how they were built. The four million dollars in the Mexican file was built from two layers of assumption, and the original article was honest enough to say so itself. That is a rare standard, and it deserves more credit than it received.

The "media not yet invented" clause

There is a phrase in image contracts that I consider the most dangerous phrase in all of football: "all media now known or hereafter devised".

The phrase entered contracts in the 1990s, when the industry realised contracts needed to outlive technology. At the time it made sense. It still makes sense as drafting. But it produced a consequence nobody anticipated: every medium invented after 2026 had already been transferred before it existed.

Streaming. Short clips. Interactive content. Augmented reality. And most recently, synthetic likeness models.

In football, this means a player who signed an academy contract at fifteen transferred his image to a technology nobody at the time could picture, with no mechanism to renegotiate the price when that technology became real.

This is why the Mexican filing deserves reading by football people. The "caricaturisation" argument in that file is an attempt to establish that transforming an image is a separate act requiring separate permission. If a court or administrative body accepts that principle, it creates a precedent applicable to every synthetic image generated from a person's original likeness.

And in football, synthetic imagery is becoming a real market.

Synthetic faces and a negotiation that hasn't started

Over the past two years, European players' unions have begun publicly warning about players' images being used to train generative models, and about those models being able to reproduce a player's face and playing style without consent. This is not science fiction. It is a live contractual problem.

The legal question here is far more complex than a photograph on a book cover, because at least three rights layers overlap: the personality right in the face, the copyright in the photographs and footage used for training, and the club's or league's rights in match data. Those three layers belong to three different parties, and in most cases there is no agreement between them about how the data may be used.

The practical question academies have not answered: does a fifteen-year-old who signs a perpetual licence for "all media not yet invented" simultaneously license a synthetic face model that does not yet exist?

In the language of the contract, the answer is almost certainly yes. In the intention of the signatory, the answer is almost certainly no.

The gap between those two answers is where the entire dispute of the next decade will play out. And it will not play out at the level of stars. It will play out at the level of tens of thousands of young players who signed pieces of paper nobody read aloud to them.

Vietnamese football: a gap nobody has measured

I follow Vietnamese football from a distance, through screens and data reports, and I am careful about making claims regarding a market I do not live in. But there is one observation I believe is grounded.

The commercial value of Vietnamese footballers is rising faster than the legal infrastructure managing it.

A young player who breaks through at a regional tournament can gain hundreds of thousands of followers in weeks. Brands arrive. Images appear on advertising, on products, in digital content. But the legal structure to manage those images — who owns them, who licenses them, who collects, and how much the player receives — is often not built before the value appears. It is built afterwards, under pressure, once there is money on the table and a dispute in progress.

The European model cannot be transplanted wholesale. In Europe, player image rights are managed by a thick intermediary layer: licensed agents, players' unions, pension funds, collective agreements. In Vietnam that layer is much thinner. That means players have fewer shields, but also that players can retain a higher share if the structure is right from the start.

What should be borrowed from Europe is not the price level. It is the principle: image rights must have a term, must have a scope, must have a review mechanism, and must have someone representing the player in the room — not someone representing the club.

And one detail I think matters most: in Vietnamese academies, as in German academies, young players are taught to control the ball with the outside of the foot, to turn when receiving with their back to goal, to read the space between two full-backs. Nobody teaches them to read a contract clause. Yet both skills decide a footballer's life, and the second decides it for longer.

The contrarian angle: the problem isn't the right, it's the bargaining unit

The instinctive reaction to this story is to conclude that players need more control over their own image. It sounds reasonable. But thirty years of image-rights history in football shows a different result.

When image rights are fully individualised, the outcome is not that every player is paid fairly. The outcome is a brutally two-tiered system. A very small group — those with good agents, personal brands, big clubs behind them — earn enormous sums. Everyone else, the overwhelming majority, has no image contract at all, and receives zero.

Conversely, when image rights are collectivised, the outcome is a system that pays everybody and pays everybody little — including those who should be receiving vastly more.

Neither model is fair. But the collective model has one advantage the individual model lacks: it pays the people with no voice. Second-tier players, women players, young players — the ones who will never have an agent strong enough to negotiate separately with a global publisher.

So the real blind spot in this whole debate is not who owns the image. It is who sits at the negotiating table. Owning an asset without a bargaining unit means the asset exists only on paper. In football, the effective bargaining unit has always been a collective large enough that a publisher must open the door, combined with a distribution mechanism flexible enough not to flatten every value to an average.

No system in the world currently does both at once. That is why cases like the Mexican filing keep appearing, and why they will appear more frequently as synthetic imagery gets cheaper.

The heart behind the tactics — I do not ask who deserves to be paid, I ask who holds the right to sit at the table.

What to watch

There are four signals I will be tracking in the coming months, and I suggest football people track them too.

First, how Mexico's administrative authority handles the alteration argument. If the principle that "transforming an image to sell is a distinct act of exploitation" is accepted, it becomes the first precedent directly portable to synthetic imagery in sport.

Second, whether the publisher is compelled to disclose sales data. If it is, the four-million multiplication will be replaced by a real figure, and we will learn something about the distance between gross revenue and actual receipt.

Third, any clause on synthetic likeness appearing in the next collective licensing agreements signed by players' unions. That is where this question is truly decided, and it is decided far more quietly than a lawsuit.

Fourth, page seven of the next academy contract I am shown. I will read it aloud. Not for the fifteen-year-old — he will not understand all of it, and that is not his failing. I will read it aloud for the coach, for the academy director, for anyone in the room who can change it.

Three hundred and seventy-six views do not make a tactical analyst — but a young coach willing to read to the final word just might.

A forty-word clause works the same way.

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